The End of Television—Again! How TV Is Still Influenced by Cultural Factors in the Age of Digital Intermediaries by Enli, Gunn & Syvertsen, Trine
 Media and Communication, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 142-153 142 
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183-2439) 
2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 142-153 
Doi: 10.17645/mac.v4i3.547 
 
Article 
The End of Television—Again! How TV Is Still Influenced by Cultural 
Factors in the Age of Digital Intermediaries 
Gunn Enli * and Trine Syvertsen 
Department of Media and Communication, University of Oslo, 0317 Oslo, Norway; E-Mails: gunn.enli@media.uio.no 
(G.E.), trine.syvertsen@media.uio.no (T.S.) 
* Corresponding author 
Submitted: 31 December 2015 | Accepted: 25 February 2016 | Published: 14 July 2016 
Abstract 
This article discusses the impact of convergence and digital intermediaries for television as a medium, industry and po-
litical and cultural institution. There is currently widespread debate about the future of television and the impact of 
technological and market changes. Our argument is that the answer to what is happening to television cannot be ade-
quately addressed on a general level; local and contextual factors are still important, and so is the position and strategic 
response of existing television institutions in each national context. Based on analyses of political documents, statistics, 
audience research and media coverage, as well as secondary literature, the article explores the current situation for 
Norwegian television and point to four contexts that each plays a part in constraining and enabling existing television op-
erators: the European context, the public service context, the welfare state context and the media ecosystem context. 
Keywords 
convergence; Norway; public service broadcasting; television 
Issue 
This article is part of the issue “(Not Yet) the End of Television”, edited by Milly Buonanno (University of Roma “La 
Sapienza”, Italy). 
© 2016 by the author(s); licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attrib-
ution 4.0 International License (CC BY). 
 
1. Introduction 
There is currently widespread debate about what is 
happening with television and how technological and 
market changes may undermine the medium’s future.1 
The article argues that the answer to what is happening 
to television cannot be adequately answered on a gen-
eral level—television’s future is not just determined by 
technological and economic developments, but also by 
local and contextual factors: history, structure, regula-
tion, user patterns, as well as the position and strategic 
response of specific institutions in each national context. 
The article draws on political documents, statistics, au-
dience research, and media coverage, as well as previ-
                                                          
1 For an overview over how the forces challenging traditional 
television are discussed on the level of policy, see, for example, 
(DAF/COMP/GF (2013)13). 
ous studies and secondary literature, to discuss factors 
influencing the future of television and relate these to a 
specific national case. With few exceptions (see, for ex-
ample, Dhoest & Simons, 2013; Turner & Tay, 2009) the 
debate about the future of television builds on evidence 
from large countries, predominantly from the Anglo-
American sphere. The article contributes by focusing on 
a Nordic country, characterized by a combination of a 
high usage of global online streaming services, but also 
high use of public service television and high demand for 
domestic content. As Pertierra and Turner (2013) argue, 
television studies can only move forward if the object of 
study is more explicitly located within specific political 
economic and geo-linguistic spaces. 
Theoretically, the article draws on perspectives on 
economic and technological change, as well as theories 
of “media welfare state” and “media ecosystems” 
pointing to cultural and political factors. The analysis is 
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divided into three parts, each with an accompanying 
research question. These are: 1) What are the current 
changes in contemporary technologies, contents, mar-
kets and industries that point towards a fundamental 
change in the understanding of and conditions for televi-
sion? 2) Which political, economic and cultural contexts 
may help to explain differences between national cases 
in how television develops, which contexts are particu-
larly relevant in the Norwegian case, and how do these 
contexts enable or constrain existing TV companies? 3) 
How do traditional television institutions in Norway—
public service as well as private—respond to the general 
and specific challenges and with what impact? The dis-
cussion is framed by a general introduction on “the end 
of television” debate and ends with a concluding discus-
sion on the factors shaping television today. 
2. “The End of Television”—Again! 
The changing conditions for television are a hot topic, 
both in the trade press and in academic conferences 
and papers. Titles like Traditional TV has survived the 
net threat, but for how much longer? (Naughton, 
2012), Online streaming services are becoming a threat 
to broadcast television (Morrison, 2014), and Cord-
nevers could be bigger threat to TV than cord-cutters 
(Harris, 2015), indicate a new turnaround in the spiral of 
change that for decades have dominated industry and 
journalistic discourse on television. Changes in technolo-
gies and markets, as well as the emergence of new ser-
vices with new business models, are not only seen to 
threaten the position of established market actors, but 
the very understanding and definition of television. In-
deed, in academic contributions the very term “televi-
sion” seems to need an increasing number of add-ons 
to be precise. Since the turn of the century, research 
literature has suggested to separate between definitions 
such as “broadcast TV” and “post-broadcast TV”, “TV” 
and “television”, “linear-TV” and “non-linear TV” (Lotz, 
2007; Olsson & Spiegel, 2004; Turner & Tay, 2009).  
Despite attempts at clarification, it is not always 
easy to understand which aspects of television that are 
challenged or threatened by which forces. The most 
common understanding of (traditional) television is 
that it is a system of distributing mixed schedule pro-
gramming simultaneously to a mass audience watching 
in their homes on traditional sets, and where advertis-
ing and fees are the most important sources of reve-
nue (Doyle, 2015; Ellis, 2000; Katz & Scannell, 2009). 
This model seems to be challenged on at least three 
counts. First, the fragmentation of audiences may un-
dermine the mass media aspect of television; second, 
traditional television companies may not be able to ac-
quire the content they need to uphold an attractive 
schedule, and third, the very business model may be 
undermined as both viewers and advertisers are seen 
as migrating away from the broadcast platform. 
The challenges are real and important and have 
considerable impact on both the understanding of and 
conditions for television. Yet, we agree with those who 
are sceptical of the current tendency to talk in terms of 
boom and doom—boom for new media and doom for 
television (Donders, Pauwels, & Loisen, 2013, pp 11-
20). The rhetoric in the debates is infused by expecta-
tions of immense progress or of steep decline, and the 
predictions about revolution in the TV sector are often 
voiced by actors who have vested interests in the reali-
zation of these predictions. An illustrative example is 
that the co-founder and chief executive officer (CEO) of 
the online TV streaming company Netflix, Reed Has-
tings, in 2015 argued that “In ten years-time, or twenty 
at the most, linear TV with a fixed schedule will be 
dead”. He points to how the landline telephone be-
came irrelevant with the introduction of the cell phone, 
and predicts that online streaming will similarly replace 
traditional TV. This type of rhetoric gets broad cover-
age; the press covers new actors such as Netflix and 
new trends in TV usage such as “binge watching” ex-
tensively, but are less fascinated with stories about the 
resilience of traditional forms of television. A key rhe-
torical challenge for traditional TV companies is to 
combat the image of an old-fashioned, irrelevant, and 
dying industry, which is partly constructed by their new 
competitors’ marketing strategists.  
In the light of the dire predictions for traditional 
television, two points are particularly important. The 
first point is historical: We are not the first generation 
to be faced with the question of “what is television?” 
(or what is any other medium for that matter). Televi-
sion was not defined from the start, and the introduc-
tion of the new medium caused a series of debates 
about how to characterize TV, most often based on 
definitions of existing media technologies (Enli, 2015 p. 
48). Since these early days, television has gone through 
many phases and taken on various forms such as ex-
perimental, monopoly, paternalist public service, com-
petition, scheduling, niche channels, cable and satel-
lite, on-demand and pay-tv—each with separate 
features that impact on how television is understood.  
In the last three decades, debates about television 
have increasingly been framed in a context of radical 
change. From the 1990s onwards, cyber-optimists such 
as George Gilder have celebrated the coming of inter-
net as liberation from the “tyranny” of television (Life 
after television, 1992). The predictions and debates 
continued throughout the late 1990s and 2000s with 
debates and book titles such as The end of television? 
(e.g. Katz & Scannell, 2009). While all this went on, 
however, there was massive reorientation and strategic 
decision-making in television companies, including the 
decision to digitalise production and distribution and de-
velop niche channels and online services. After a quarter 
of a century of “the end of television”, it is interesting 
that there is still so much television left to debate. 
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The other initial point is political: Different stake-
holders have different stakes in defining television; def-
initions are not apolitical but serve specific purposes. A 
lot of the current confusion around how to define tele-
vision is rooted in regulatory challenges; for regulators 
it is important to decide whether or not something is 
television because this determines how it should be 
regulated. The regulatory definitions need to be very 
precise, because imposing a wrong framework may be 
perilous to innovation, unfair to certain operators and 
damage the reputation of the regulators. As a rule, tra-
ditional broadcasters are regulated stricter than pay-
television whereas online services have the least strict 
regulatory framework.2 Faced with new types of audio-
visual content, regulators struggle with categorization, 
and decisions are contested. Girginova (2015) discuss 
some interesting examples where the British regulator 
OFCOM has determined that certain clips are “TV-like”, 
based on technical and economic dimensions; cultural 
and contextual dimensions, and the degree to which 
the purpose of the services are comparable with TV 
(Girginova, 2015). Operators often disagree, however, 
and in the case of a particular on-line service, “Top 
Gear YouTube”, the BBC protested, claiming that clips 
were not intended to be consumed like TV, but as 
“tasters” of the television shows (Ofcom, 2013).  
This demonstrates that the understanding of what 
TV is has not only changed historically, but fluctuates 
according to perspective and stakeholder interest. The 
definition of television cannot be reduced to technical 
specificities as television is infused with history and cul-
tural meaning. While it is easy to describe a linear model 
of television using technological and economic charac-
teristics, what we may call “cultural models of televi-
sion” display varying features from context to context. 
From the medium’s early history, many have ana-
lysed television as culture, cf. seminal analyses such as 
Raymond Williams’ Television—technology and cultural 
form (1974/2008). As Lotz (2014) points out, 
“[f]oundational understandings of television view it as 
a—if not the—central communicative and cultural 
force in society.” This position derives from television’s 
“availability and ubiquity” (emphasis in original) and its 
role as a conveyor of information that “reflects, chal-
lenges and respond to shared debates and concerns” 
(p. 37). In addition, Lotz discusses television as a cul-
tural industry, which in the US implies that it “operates 
as a commercial enterprise that primarily seeks to max-
imise profits, while nonetheless producing programs 
that are important creative and cultural forms that 
communicate social values and beliefs” (p. 37). In this 
article, we are concerned with television both as a 
transmitter of culture and as a cultural industry, in this 
case as an industry with somewhat different character-
istics than US television. However, we are also con-
                                                          
2 See for example Levy (1999). 
cerned with television as culture in a wider sense; tele-
vision as a product of, and a constitutive element in, 
certain national and regional political cultures. We dis-
cuss how different cultural and political contexts im-
pose general and specific expectations of what televi-
sion should do that goes beyond television as a cultural 
industry or medium of storytelling.  
In the article we join forces with scholars who point 
to the importance of continuity when studying the de-
velopment of television (Dhoest & Simons, 2013; Ellis, 
2000; Gripsrud, 2010; Tay & Turner, 2010).3 Perriera 
and Turner (2013) use the concept of “zones” to de-
scribe “the various contexts and scales in which televi-
sion can be located” (p. 6); zones include households, 
communities and nations, as well as a more discursive 
zone of “modernity”. By locating television in various 
zones, Pertierra and Turner identify disruptive as well as 
stabilising forces and point to several forms of resilience 
that is underestimated in the current debates, such as 
the “resilience of the state as an actor in the media sec-
tor” (p. 47), “the resilience and persistence of the na-
tional even within highly commercialized media envi-
ronments” (p. 52) and “what some see as a surprising 
resilience in the free-to-air audience” (p. 9). Accordingly, 
Pertierra and Turner (2013) argue that research should 
increasingly focus on the impact of cultural factors on 
TV’s development, and suggests that studies should 
draw on evidence from different contexts to counter the 
tendency to see developments as “linear, evolutionary 
process with only a single point of destination” (p. 11). 
The authors of this article have previously analysed 
transitions in television (Enli, 2008, 2015; Enli, Moe, 
Sundet, & Syvertsen, 2013; Ihlebæk, Syvertsen, & 
Ytreberg, 2013; Syvertsen, 1992, 1997, 2008). We ob-
serve that each transition to some degree recycles es-
tablished patterns, yet, in each transition there are also 
new elements creating a particular kind of confusion 
and disruption. Consequently, we are concerned about 
both continuity and change, and both about general 
forces and the geographical and cultural specificities in 
a national setting. 
3. Convergence and Digital Intermediaries 
We turn now to the first of our analytical research 
questions 1) What are the current changes in contem-
porary technologies, contents, markets and industries 
that point towards a fundamental change in the under-
standing of and conditions for television? The specific 
impact of convergence for existing media is complex to 
disentangle and subject to much discussion and debate 
                                                          
3 As Dhoest and Simons (2013, p. 19) argue, the current chang-
es are real and important, yet, “[i]ndustry and journalistic dis-
courses in particular seem to be so preoccupied with changes 
and innovations that mainstream contemporary television 
practices all but disappear from view”.  
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(Dwyer, 2010; Jenkins, 2006; Jensen, 2010; Lotz, 2014; 
Staiger & Hake, 2009). In this article, the discussion is 
narrowed down to the challenges which are currently 
causing most tensions: the disruptive impact of so-
called digital intermediaries.  
Digital intermediaries, also called “internet inter-
mediaries” or “digital disruptive intermediaries (DDI)”, 
are often understood as a third party which enters an 
industry and provides new digital services that chal-
lenge established business models and change the way 
value is created or distributed (Riemer, Gal, Hamann, 
Gilchriest, & Teixeira, 2015). The term digital interme-
diaries refers to a mixed group of services that have in 
common that they function as algorithm-based gate-
keepers; among the prominent sub-categories are news 
aggregators, social media, search engines, digital stores 
and content providers (Mansell, 2015). The most disrup-
tive digital intermediaries in regards to linear television 
are content aggregators such as Netflix, HBO, Amazon 
and YouTube, in addition to the digital media player and 
micro console AppleTV, which represents a significant 
gatekeeper to and third party provider of TV content.  
The impact of digital intermediaries varies between 
the services and there are also differences in produc-
tion, distribution, and business models. YouTube is a 
hybrid media environment where both users and es-
tablished companies distribute their content without 
costs, thus reducing the traditional distinction between 
professionally produced and user-generated content. 
Netflix, on the other hand, distributes professionally 
produced content to paying subscribers, and competes 
much more directly with established TV operators for 
content, audiences and revenue. Along with similar 
services (such as HBO and Hulu in the US), these ser-
vices directly challenge the principles of linear distribu-
tion and mixed scheduling. Social media such as Face-
book may be both disruptive and supportive to 
traditional television in a variety of ways; they provide 
viewers with audio-visual content, serve as add-ons to 
existing shows, are used for promotion (Market-
ingCharts, 2014) and viewer engagement, and work as 
a vehicle for interactive advertising.  
In addition to their separate features, the digital in-
termediaries together accelerate the general economic 
and technological pressures on television. First, digital 
intermediaries increase audience fragmentation by 
making viewing more individualized; viewers are liber-
ated from schedules and freed to make personalized 
choices about what programmes to watch at what 
times, on what devices and through which platforms. 
New technologies have, as Lotz (2014, p. 40) puts it 
“ruptured the norm of simultaneity in television expe-
rience and enabled audiences to capture television on 
their own terms”. Consequently, TV begins to function 
less as a “flow” medium and more like publishing 
(bookstore, library) (p. 39), and it is more difficult to 
uphold a common sphere.  
Second, digital intermediaries challenge television’s 
position as content-provider. Internet-only channels 
like Netflix and Amazon Prime Instant Video do not on-
ly compete with traditional TV-firms by delivering con-
tent directly to fee-payers, they also produce original 
content based on more specific user data than tradi-
tional TV companies (Carr, 2013). As competition for 
attractive content increases, new divisions are becom-
ing visible between different types of content that de-
fies traditional genre divisions. Lotz (2014) distin-
guishes between three tentative categories based on 
functions for the viewers: “Prized content” which 
“people seek out and specifically desire” such as origi-
nal and popular drama series (p. 12), “live sports and 
contests” which are exceptional and time sensitive (p. 
13), and “linear content” which is what audiences 
watch for companionship, distraction and entertain-
ment (p. 15).  
Third, digital intermediaries position themselves to 
challenge established business models through a mix-
ture or marketing strategies, content strategies, and 
rhetorical strategies. The new entrants argue that 
streaming and online services contribute to progress 
and innovation, price-reduction and customer satisfac-
tion, as well as increased quality in content. The confi-
dence of the newcomers is partly based on the tenden-
cy of “cord-cutting” among the so-called millennials (a 
term referring to consumers dropping cable or satellite 
TV subscription in favour of online video sources)4, and 
the fact that younger viewers everywhere watch less 
linear television. Although convergence and cord-
cutting challenge both advertising and licence fees as 
business models, the threat to advertising is more pro-
found because it is more dependent on linear-TV. In-
ternet advertising is growing and about to close the 
gap to television in the market for audio-visual adver-
tising, there is yet no viable business model for audio-
visual content on platforms such as smart phones that 
equals the traditional thirty second ad, and television 
increasingly must supplement traditional sources of 
revenue with show-by-show-based funding such as 
placement, integration, branded events and sponsor-
ship (Lotz, 2014).  
The fourth factor is of a more political nature point-
ing beyond market and technology to the next part of 
our analysis; the digital intermediaries’ reluctance to 
being defined as media companies, defining them-
selves instead as technology companies not subject to 
audio-visual regulations (Napoli, 2014). Digital inter-
mediaries are not regulated through licences or con-
tracts with governments and not obliged to provide 
certain programming or contribute to local content 
production. The companies still engage with policy; 
Netflix has for example engaged lobbyists in Washing-
                                                          
4 see e.g. Strangelove (2015), and http://www.digitaltrends. 
com/topic/cord-cutting-101 
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ton DC to promote liberalization of restrictions on per-
sonal data-sharing, as well as voicing their interests in 
net neutrality and bandwidth caps (Johnston, 2012) but 
tend to ignore invitations to consultations regarding for 
example contributions to domestic production. In a re-
sponse to such an invitation from the Norwegian Min-
istry of Culture, Netflix’ chief of communication Joris 
Evers claimed that executives were busy: “We follow 
the Norwegian debate with interest, but can unfortu-
nately not be present in all forums.” (Tobiassen, 2015; 
Vollan 2015). 
These examples demonstrate the potential impact 
of digital intermediaries for televisions’ relationship 
with audiences, producers, financiers and stakeholders. 
But television isn’t just a technology with some con-
tent—or “a toaster with pictures” as former FCC 
Chairman Mark Fowler named it at the height of de-
regulation in the US.5 Television is infused with mean-
ing, history and culture, and is deeply woven into the 
social fabric. 
4. Political and Cultural Contexts 
Comparative studies show that political and cultural 
contexts continue to be important for how television 
develops, and not least for the ability of existing televi-
sion companies to design effective strategies in the 
current situation.6 We turn now to the second research 
question: 2) Which political, economic and cultural 
contexts may help to explain differences between na-
tional cases in how television develops, which contexts 
are particularly relevant in the Norwegian case, and 
how do these contexts enable or constrain existing TV 
companies? Four contexts will be discussed with rele-
vance for Norwegian television: the European context, 
the public service media context, the welfare state 
context and the “media ecosystem” context.  
Norway is a European country, i.e. part of a territo-
ry where television to a high degree has been ascribed 
social and cultural functions. In Europe, there is much 
concern and public debate about the challenges of new 
digital services. The European market is fragmented 
compared to the US, and one concern is about whether 
increased competition and new distribution models 
will undermine demand for European content and/or 
production. Just as concerns were raised about “Dallas-
ification of TV content” in the 1970s and 1980s (Miller, 
2003) the term “Googlization of everything” (Vaidhyna-
than, 2011) can stand as a metaphor for some of the 
current debates. A concern for EU policy makers is that 
the current digital market in Europe is made up by 54% 
US online services, 42% national online services, and 
only 4% EU cross-border online services (European 
                                                          
 
6 See, for example, Ibarra, Nowak and Kuhn (2015) on public 
service television and Donders et al. (2013) for private televi-
sion. 
Commission, 2015a). The European political strategy, 
under the label of the Digital Single Market, encom-
passes different responses to encourage free flow of 
online services and entertainment across European na-
tional borders. A stated goal for EU policy makers is to 
safeguard media pluralism, and to guarantee the inde-
pendence of national media regulators in the age of 
convergence. The on-going review of the EU Audio-
visual Media Service Directive includes a public consul-
tation where member states and other stakeholders 
expressed their opinions, European Commission 
(2015b) and is intended to outline new principles for 
deciding whether new types of services should be sub-
ject to regulation, and to reduce the uneven playing 
field between operators. In addition to regulatory 
changes, the EU is continuing the financial support for 
European culture and media through the Creative Eu-
rope programme such as drama, animations and doc-
umentaries (European Commission, 2016) This type of 
content may not just serve as “prized content” specifi-
cally desired by audiences; it is also a type of content 
desired by regulators, policy makers and stakeholders 
active in the cultural sphere. Parallel to the increased 
availability of US content, there is increased production 
of national content and Nordic and European co-
production. This counter-trend can additionally be ex-
plained by institutional strategies and international 
trends, such as the BBCs strategies for export, in-
creased global format trade, and the popularity of 
Nordic noir (Hill & Steemers, 2011; Weissmann, 2009). 
This fits well with a historical lesson: even if US prod-
ucts have become hugely popular in Europe, there 
have been continued demand for domestic services 
and products, and willingness to use public funding to 
sustain quality productions.7 
The second context is the public service media con-
text; Norway belongs to the group of countries consti-
tuting the heartland of public service broadcasting, 
along with Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Japan (McKinsey, 2004; Mendel, 2000; Moe & Syv-
ertsen, 2009). The public service tradition in these 
countries is very different from the US system of public 
broadcasting which is much more marginal and poorly 
funded (Freedman, 2008). At each point of transition, 
the public service broadcasting institutions have lost 
audiences and key content to competitors, and there 
are constant discussions over the viability of public 
funding (Born, 2003; Donders & Pauwels, 2008; Levy, 
1999). In spite of this on-going debate, however, the 
public service media companies have retained a 
stronger position than most observers expected, and 
have sustained popularity and legitimacy (Lowe & Mar-
tin, 2014; Moe, 2009; Syvertsen, 2008; Syvertsen, Enli, 
                                                          
7 In the US only a couple of dollars per capita are spent on pub-
lic media whereas spending in Northern Europe are above fifty 
or even hundred dollars per capita (Kenyon, 2014, p. 387) 
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Moe, & Mjøs, 2014). The attempts to restrict public 
service on the European level have not been successful 
(Donders, 2013), instead, much of the future of public 
service media continue to be determined nationally 
(Moe, 2007, p. 52). In the countries representing the 
heartland of public service broadcasting, the institu-
tions’ future continues to be one of the most salient is-
sues in cultural debates, and a variety of stakeholders 
are engaged to preserve what they see as their crucial 
characteristics. Two issues are indicative of the type of 
support the institutions are enjoying: the legitimacy of 
the business model and the degree to which they are 
allowed to develop online services in new markets. On 
both counts the Norwegian conditions are favourable 
for public broadcasters: in 2015, 70% said they were 
getting value for money by paying the fee (Myhre, 
2015) and the conservative/right-wing government in 
2015 decided to retain the licence fee for the time be-
ing (Kulturdepartementet, 2015). Legislation has also 
allowed the public media company to expand onto dig-
ital and online platforms in order to sustain a competi-
tive position (Bulck & Donders, 2014; Moe, 2009). 
In addition to the European and public service con-
text, Norway belongs to the Nordic region of welfare 
states. Also the implications of this context point in dif-
ferent directions. On the one hand, Nordic welfare 
states have attached great importance on media as a 
vehicle to change society. Syvertsen et al. (2014) labels 
the media policy construction in the Nordic countries 
“the media welfare state” and argues that national 
media, and in particular television, continue to be 
treated as important welfare state institutions: univer-
sally available, with social purposes and a stated mis-
sion to facilitate integration, democratic dialogue and 
national culture. Like other fundamental aspects of the 
welfare state, there has been political consensus sur-
rounding central media policy aims, and broad support 
for the idea that the state is obliged to uphold infra-
structure to facilitate “an enlightened public conversa-
tion”8 (see also Kulturdepartementet, 2015, p. 7). On 
the other hand, this also implies that there is consen-
sus about the need for public institutions and policies 
to change and adapt, not least to become more inno-
vative in terms of a digital future (Moe, 2009). Nordic 
welfare states are not just characterised by a high level 
of state regulation, they are also known for economic 
wealth and adaptability, and high take-up of new ser-
vices such as online news, online shopping, social me-
                                                          
8 This expectation is to some degree strengthened in recent 
decades. In 2004, the Norwegian constitutions’ paragraph on 
free speech (para. 100) was amended obliging the state to fa-
cilitate infrastructure to secure “an enlightened public conver-
sation” (Sønneland, n.d.), and this obligation was used in 2015 
to justify the current conservative-right wing government’s 
continuing support for publicly funded media (Kulturdeparte-
mentet, 2015). 
dia, and digital streaming services (Syvertsen et al., 
2014). The take-up of Netflix in Norway is a telling ex-
ample; since its launch in October 2012 the service 
grew rapidly to reach 30% of all households in 2015 
making Norway a top user of the streaming service 
(Fossbakken, 2015). Consequently, the context of a 
(wealthy) Nordic media welfare state implies an inter-
esting combination of enabling and constraining fac-
tors: both increased competition for traditional televi-
sion institutions and continuing support for their 
cultural and political functions. 
The fourth context is that of media ecosystems. The 
concept of media ecosystem is used in many different 
ways, pointing to the increasing interdependence of 
different media and technologies and how develop-
ments in one sector affect others (Colapinto, 2010; 
Hiler, 2002; Lasica, 2003). In this context, the concept 
of ecosystem implies a perspective where existing na-
tional television companies are not judged solely on 
their own merits, but seen as vehicles to regulate and 
obtain results across the media market. A study of pri-
vate-public partnership in another small TV market, 
that of Flanders (part of Belgium) describe the regula-
tory approach to television as a strategic “ecosystem 
approach” in which policy-makers encourage collabo-
ration between private and public institutions (Raats & 
Pauwels, 2013).9 In this approach, public and private 
media are not seen as opposites competing with each 
other, but as elements in a common system, comple-
menting each other, and the role of public service me-
dia are explicitly defined as that of a standard setter for 
the whole industry. Public media companies are ex-
pected to raise quality and diversity overall, as well as 
serving as a “digital locomotive”; spearheading the 
transition to information societies and lead in innova-
tion and risk-taking (Aslama & Syvertsen, 2007). Fur-
thermore, public service companies are increasingly 
obligated to decrease their competitive stance vs other 
operators; instead of competing head-on with private 
television and new media, they should cooperate and 
act as facilitators. The Norwegian Government’s recent 
white paper on public service broadcasting suggests 
that the Norwegian broadcasting corporation (NRK) 
should have “an independent responsibility for media 
pluralism” (Kulturdepartementet, 2015). The ‘ecosys-
tem’ approach is a response to strong criticism that 
public media institutions have become too privileged 
and a threat to private actors, and is part of an effort to 
find new legitimation for public service media. At the 
same time, the approach has the potential of making 
existing television institutions more outward-looking as 
the focus is moved to the public broadcasters’ sur-
                                                          
9 This type of public-private cooperation is also described with-
in the context of “the media welfare state”, but is discussed 
under this heading since it also has much to do with market 
size and certain cooperative traditions (Syvertsen et al., 2014). 
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rounding stakeholders, such as cultural actors and pri-
vate media companies (Raats & Pauwels, 2013, p. 205).  
In this part we have taken Norway as a case and 
discussed four contexts that each illustrates the con-
tinuing importance of political and cultural factors for 
how television is defined and understood. These types 
of contexts are important for filtering and modifying 
the general challenges in each national case, and they 
are crucial for enabling and constraining the means 
that existing television companies can employ to de-
sign strategies for the future.  
5. Strategic Responses of National Broadcasters 
Convergence, as well as the specific challenges related 
to digital intermediaries, has significant impact on the 
conditions for existing television companies. Most no-
tably, the future is becoming less predictable for televi-
sion and it has become more difficult for executives to 
invest in long-term perspectives (Küng, 2015). Television 
companies are still expected serve the public sphere as 
well as competing in the market; in the past as well as in 
the present this duality has proved a difficult balancing 
act. We turn now to the third research question: 3) How 
do traditional television institutions in Norway—public 
service as well as private—respond to the general and 
specific challenges and with what impact?  
First, a common strategy for both public and private 
TV companies is to expand onto new platforms to com-
bat audience fragmentation and secure new sources of 
revenue. Historically, television companies have been 
afraid of losing out to competitors if they are cut off 
from new platforms, and have embraced digital televi-
sion as well as mobile and online services (Enli, 2008; 
Levy, 1999; McQuail & Siune, 1998; Moe, 2009). More 
recently, Norwegian television companies have 
adapted strategies used by the digital intermediaries, 
such as releasing drama series for online streaming be-
fore aired on broadcast TV, releasing an entire season 
in one bulk, rather than weekly episodes, launching 
applications for Apple-TV, iPhone, and Android, and 
filming in mobile phone friendly format (Jerijervi, 
2015). The established broadcasters have also become 
increasingly aware of the marketing effect of social 
media, using Facebook, as well as Instagram and Snap-
chat, as new platforms for distribution of content (To-
lonen et al., 2015). The broadcasters typically use digi-
tal platforms to create a universe to support the brand 
and to point users from television programs to mobile 
and online services, and back to television. In NRK vo-
cabulary, this strategy is termed “keeping them and 
moving them” (Ihlebæk et al., 2013, p. 478). Moreover, 
TV companies increasingly facilitate activities on a sec-
ond screen, and Twitter is particularly used as a “back-
channel” for user- debates while watching sports, news 
events, drama series or entertainment shows (Bruns, 
Moe, Burgess, & Burgess, 2015). This has placed tradi-
tional broadcasters in a strategically important position, 
not only as a provider of audio-visual content, but as a 
point of reference in social media debates and online 
environments. A study of Twitter hashtags for example 
found that the established broadcasters and their flag-
ship news programmes are the most used hashtags in 
Norwegian Twitter debates (Enli & Simonsen, 2016).  
Second, the public and private companies are in-
creasingly keen to cooperate and build alliances in or-
der to protect content and common interests. In partic-
ular, there is increased cooperation between the public 
broadcaster NRK and the private broadcaster TV 2, the 
second national broadcaster with some public service 
obligations. As a response to the high costs of sports 
rights and the small size of the Norwegian TV-market, 
the two companies joined forces to buy FIFA World Cup 
(2014), and divided the matches between them. The 
CEO’s of the two companies have also proclaimed their 
intention to cooperate more strategically in the future, 
regretting in an interview that they had been too busy 
competing against each other for rights and distribu-
tion to discover that “Netflix was moving straight into 
their markets grabbing 500,000 customers” (Aune, 
2015, authors’ translation) Reflecting current techno-
logical convergence, TV companies also seek partner-
ship across media sectors, such as when the Norwegian 
commercial channel TvNorge10 recently collaborated 
with the newspaper VG to acquire the rights to the na-
tional football league. Another example which reflects 
the new potential for cooperation is the partnership 
between Netflix and the public broadcaster NRK in the 
production of the series Lilyhammer. Such cross-sector 
partnership are also challenging, however; the public 
broadcaster and the US-based technology company 
turned out to have diverging interests regarding both 
the storyline and the distribution model (Sundet, 
2016). The conflicts reflected a culture crash between a 
global commercial player and a national player with 
obligations to produce content reflecting Norwegian 
culture and identity. In spite of such challenges, both 
the national and the international co-production has 
expanded and increased the relevance of the tradition-
al broadcasters in online and mobile environments.  
Third, both public and private broadcasters aim for 
a sustained flow by strategic scheduling, and use na-
tional content to reclaim the role as a national cultural 
arena. In spite of the technical possibility of time-shifting 
and non-linear viewing, the majority of TV viewing in 
Norway, and internationally, is still linear. In contrast to 
the media hype about new intermediaries replacing TV 
the statistical evidence points towards continuity: “It is 
an underestimated fact that TV viewing has actually in-
                                                          
10 TvNorge owned by Discovery since 2012, continues to pull in 
money. Turnover increased with 10% in stagnating market in 
2014. Apart from main channel TvNorge, all channels (Max, 
Fem and Discovery) licenced in UK with British rules. 
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creased in the last decade” (Tolonen et al., 2015, p. 7). 
In 2015, linear television accounted for a major share 
of the average daily viewing time, even among young 
people, by far exceeding streaming and recorded watch-
ing. Moreover, the role of the PBS channels has re-
mained noticeably strong in light of recent market 
changes; in line with their Scandinavian counterparts, 
Swedish SVT and Danish DR, the NRK is popular and 
practically everyone uses public broadcasting or their 
digital services, most on a daily basis.11 Likewise, the 
main commercial channels in Norway TV 2, TvNorge, 
and TV3 have largely retained their market positions in 
spite of increased competition from global players.  
This sustainability can be explained by a combina-
tion of continuity and change; the broadcasters have 
not abandoned elementary flow strategies, meaning 
that they schedule popular lead-in programme early in 
the evening and seek to build on their popularity 
throughout the evening. The relationship between a 
variety of niche channels and the main channels have 
made the flow more complex, as schedulers lead view-
ers in vertical and horizontal directions across the 
company’s channels. With the increase in niche channels 
as well as new digital and mobile platforms, the role of 
the main channels has become more distinct and might 
best be described as “the mother ship”; research inter-
views with producers in Norwegian television show that 
the web units depend heavily on the TV platform to 
draw a mass audience and thereby generate interest in 
the digital and interactive features (Ihlebæk et al., 2013, 
pp. 475-483). The established broadcasters’ main win-
dow to the audience is their main channels as this will in 
turn drive traffic also to their other channels, and to 
their new digital platforms. The programmes that are 
most often scheduled in the attractive prime time slots 
on the main channels are original productions such as 
high-cost drama series, which provides the public and 
private TV companies with an advantage in the competi-
tion from the global digital intermediaries. In sum, the 
broadcasters’ strategies have impacted on their market 
shares, and reduced their vulnerability in the new con-
vergent market for audio-visual content.  
6. Conclusion 
The main aim of this article is to discuss the future of 
television in light of recent changes, and in particular to 
what degree the impact of convergence and digital in-
termediaries is a game-changer for traditional televi-
sion. Taking Norway as an example, we analyse TV as a 
medium, industry and political and cultural institution 
in relation to technological and market changes. We 
                                                          
11 Recent audience research shows that more than 90% of the 
population tune into the respective public service broadcasting 
services in Norway (NRK), Denmark (DR), and Sweden (SVT) 
over the course of a week (see Syvertsen et al., 2014). 
particularly emphasised the cultural contexts of Nor-
wegian television; the European policy framework, the 
national arrangement of PSB, the Media Welfare State 
and characteristics of the Nordic region and the eco-
system approach in which public and private television 
companies collaborate. Moreover, we analysed the re-
sponses from traditional private and public broadcast-
ers to technological changes and market changes relat-
ed to new global players.  
An overarching finding in the analysis is that “the 
death of television” rhetoric is not supported by empir-
ical evidence, and the rumours about TVs death is thus 
exaggerated. Even though the TV industry is currently 
undergoing significant changes, not least as a response 
to convergence and new digital intermediaries, these 
changes do not represent the full picture. In tandem 
with change and renewal, there is stability and continu-
ity. Traditional TV is still an economic, cultural, and so-
cial important medium, and as pinpointed by Lotz 
(2014, p. 170) television remains an incredible profita-
ble industry, yet not as profitable as before.  
We have demonstrated that television has also 
been in transition in previous phases, such as when the 
monopoly was demolished, when generalist channels 
were fragmented into niche channels, and when the 
user-generated audio-visual service YouTube was 
launched. In light of the importance of television, both 
as an economic factor in the cultural industry and as a 
constitutive cultural element, it is fairly logic that tele-
vision should be in transition. The fact that there are 
many stakeholders in television, both politically and 
culturally, and that they will impact on its development 
in various directions might explain why TV is not stable, 
but in more or less constant flux. The new turns televi-
sion has taken during each phase of transition under-
lines TV’s ability to adjust to change, and might even 
demonstrate the strength, sustainability and success of 
TV as a medium.  
In turn, we found that the development of televi-
sion is not linear and universal across various cultural 
contexts; TV is formed not only by technological and 
economic factors, but also by political, historical, and 
cultural factors. A reason for the dominance of the 
“end of television paradigm” is that the US context is 
often taken as universal, or as argued by Pertierra & 
Turner (2013), the “relative disinterest in acknowledg-
ing the diverse ways in which television has developed 
in various parts of the world” (p. 11). Moreover, 
Pertierra & Turner (2013, p. 8) explicitly criticise what 
they call the “mythology of the disappearing state”. This 
article demonstrates that there are diverse approaches 
to television across different political systems, and that 
interventions by the state, such as in the Nordic region, 
impacts on the developments of television to a degree 
that makes it more useful to talk about several cultural 
models for television, than to subscribe to one form of 
technologically-determinist speculation.  
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